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Abstract: 
Many of the arguments for neuroeconomics rely on mistaken assumptions about criteria of 
explanatory relevance across disciplinary boundaries and fail to distinguish between 
evidential and explanatory relevance. Building on recent philosophical work on mechanistic 
research programmes and the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation, we argue that 
explaining an explanatory presupposition or providing a lower- level explanation does not 
necessarily constitute explanatory improvement. Neuroscientific findings have explanatory 
relevance only when they inform a causal and explanatory account of the psychology of 
human decision-making. 
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1. Introduction 
The promise of neuroeconomics is the possibility of achieving better integration of 
knowledge across scientific fields. Many arguments for and against neuroeconomics revolve 
around ideas about explanation, unification, and division of labour between disciplines. Many 
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of these arguments are confused because they rely on mistaken assumptions about criteria of 
explanatory relevance across disciplinary boundaries, and they also fail to distinguish 
between evidential and explanatory relevance. Based on the mechanistic account of 
neuroscientific explanation (Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008) and the contrastive counterfactual 
theory of explanation (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 2007), we argue that the mistaken 
attributions of explanatory relevance are mainly due to two false ideas about explanation: that 
explaining an explanatory presupposition automatically improves the original explanation 
and that a lower-level mechanistic explanation is always superior to a higher-level 
explanation. It is useful to make a distinction between two quite different programmes within 
neuroeconomics: the first attempts to use neuroscientific findings to explain economic 
phenomena (behavioural economics in the scanner, as Ross 2008 calls it). The second uses 
the mathematics developed for economic equilibrium analysis to develop models for 
computational neuroscience (neurocellular economics). Our discussion will be limited to the 
former.  
 
Our main argument is that the idea of a direct connection between economics and 
neurosciences is misguided. These two fields can only be integrated via psychological 
theories of decision-making: neuroscientific findings have neither explanatory nor evidential 
relevance to economics unless these findings are interpreted in the light of substantial 
psychological theories. In our view, such integration is badly needed: economics needs a 
causally explanatory psychology of decision-making to support its behavioural assumptions 
and the future advancement of neuroscientific understanding of decision-making is dependent 
on the development of psychological theories. This idea goes against (some of) the rhetoric of 
neuroeconomics, which attempts to give the impression that neuroscience is directly relevant 
to economics (e.g., attempts to show that utility is a physiological entity). A closer look at 
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neuroeconomists’ ’recent neuroscientific theories’ (cf. Camerer et al. 2005) shows that these 
are psychological and social psychological theories, most of which were developed several 
decades ago. We argue that recognition of the proper role of psychological theory is crucial 
for the future intellectual respectability of neuroeconomic research. The current practice of 
interpreting neuroscientific findings in light of informal, common-sense psychology is not 
acceptable, as the localization of components of decision-making processes makes sense only  
in the context of substantial psychological theory. Without such a theory the localization 
hypotheses do not have any evidential or explanatory value.  
Although we hold that neuroscientific evidence is not directly explanatorily relevant for 
economics, we do not share Gul & Pesendorfer’s (2008) view that economics should be kept 
completely isolated from other disciplines. Sensible division of cognitive labour does not 
imply that economics should be a separate science. In our view, economics would benefit 
from closer integration with other sciences. The assumptions and explanations of economics 
should be consistent with the findings and theories of the various sciences that study human 
behaviour across different levels of organization. The crucial question is into which sciences 
should economics be proximately integrated? We will address this question by considering 
the conditions in which knowledge of brain mechanisms underlying economic behaviour 
could lead to an explanatory improvement with respect to the economic phenomena. Our 
thesis is that neuroscientific findings provide evidence primarily for psychological research, 
and neuroscientific findings are relevant for economics only when mediated via substantial 
psychological theories.  
In this paper, we will not address the methodological challenges in the use of neuroscientific 
data to support localization hypotheses. There are general inferential problems with these 
hypotheses (Uttal 2001; Glymour 2001) as well as more local technical challenges. For 
example, the localisation claims made on the basis of fMRI-imaging studies face significant 
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problems owing to the temporal and spatial resolutions of the data and the inability of the 
BOLD signal to distinguish between active processing and neuromodulation (Logothetis 
2008). There are also problems with experimental design, sample sizes and statistics used 
(Harrison 2008). Our concern in this paper will be the explanatory relevance of the 
neuroscientific findings that pass these methodological hurdles.  
2. Explanatory relevance across levels of mechanisms 
Many advocates of neuroeconomics claim that they are in the business of opening the black 
box of the decision-making agent and are thus advancing a mechanistic explanation of 
individual economic behaviour (e.g., Camerer et al. 2005). Opening up black boxes and 
finding explanations in terms of “lower-level” mechanisms is often regarded as a self-evident 
improvement in our explanatory knowledge. Our aim in this section is to replace this intuitive 
view with an explicit theory of explanation and to see under what conditions and to what 
extent opening black boxes can be regarded as an explanatory improvement within 
economics.  
According to the contrastive counterfactual theory of explanation (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski 
and Kuorikoski 2009), explaining a phenomenon amounts to exhibiting the factors it depends 
on.1 Dependence can be analysed using counterfactual conditionals: A depends on B if it is 
true that if B had been different, then A would have been different as well. Furthermore, most 
ordinary explanations expressed in natural language are ambiguous and can be made more 
precise by explicating contrasts for the thing to be explained (the explanandum) and the 
explanatory factor (the explanans). This is based on the fact that explanations do not relate 
events or phenomena as a whole. An individual explanation always addresses only specific 
aspects of phenomena, which are conceptualised in some specific manner. Explicating the 
contrast is a way of making this conceptualisation explicit (Ylikoski 2007). Explanations can 
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be considered as answers to questions in the form Why is it the case that A rather than A*. 
The answers to these questions also have a contrastive form: B rather than B* being the case 
is the explanation for the occurrence of A rather than A*. More generally, explanations can 
be taken to relate variables. The formulation of explanations in terms of variables explicates 
the implicit space of alternative possibilities in which the explanations are considered (the 
contrast classes), thus making both the explanans and the explanandum more precise.  
What makes a piece of information explanatory rather than purely descriptive is that the 
exhibited dependency enables one to infer to counterfactual situations beyond what actually 
happens. This ability to answer what-if-things-had-been-different -questions (what if -
questions for short) can be taken as the core of the intuitive notion of understanding (Ylikoski 
2009). Our theory of explanation thus rests on the basic idea that the more inferences you can 
make with the help of the explanatory information (including inferences about things beyond 
what actually happened), the better off you are in terms of explanatory understanding. A 
crucial insight provided by the contrastive counterfactual theory is that causal explanatory 
knowledge is necessary for manipulation. Merely descriptive knowledge (knowledge of 
regularities) is sufficient for non-manipulative, passive prediction, but knowledge about 
causal dependencies underlying any manifest regularity is necessary when predicting the 
behaviour of the system when it is subjected to exogenous changes, such as goal-directed 
manipulation. (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2009.) 
We are now in a position to argue that an explanation is not necessarily improved when the 
explanans is itself explained. To see why this is the case, one has to see the difference 
between explaining a phenomenon and explaining an explanatory presupposition of that 
explanation. Once the contrast class for the explanandum is set, there is (usually) a 
determinate fact of the matter of what its explanation is. When we know what the 
explanandum variable is dependent on and what form this dependency takes, there is nothing 
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more to be explained about this particular contrastive explanandum. For example, once we 
know that whether a player rejects rather than accepts a specific offer in the ultimatum game 
depends on the intensity of the player’s social preferences (if there is such a thing), the 
explanation-seeking ‘why’ question is answered. Further explaining the explanans, whether it 
be causally explaining the value of the explanans variable (why the subject came to have 
such social preferences) or constitutively explaining the form of the explanatory dependency 
(how the decision making mechanism is realised), is not an explanatory improvement with 
respect to the original explanandum. Even if we knew that the social preferences and the 
associated deliberation mechanism were (partly) realised by the neurons in the ventromedial 
PFC Broadman areas 10 and 11, this information would not add to the original explanation of 
why rejection rather than acceptance, since the activation of the neurons mentioned would 
make the same difference as the social preferences. Of course, discovering new explanations 
increases our overall understanding of the phenomenon of decision making, but it may do 
little to advance our understanding about the original domain of phenomena of interest (e.g., 
economic phenomena involving altruistic punishment). Explaining such explanatory 
presuppositions may have evidential virtue in that our knowledge of the original explanans is 
more secure, owing to our new findings (discovering the neural mechanisms realising social 
preferences is evidence for their existence), but evidential and explanatory virtues are not the 
same thing (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2009).  
Nor is it the case that a ‘lower-level’ explanation that replaces the original explanation is 
always to be preferred to a higher-level one. The details of the lower-level mechanisms that 
realise the upper-level variables are explanatory irrelevant for the higher-level explanandum, 
if changes in the lower-level detail do not make a difference to the value of the original 
explanandum variable. Even if we had secure knowledge about the lower-level mechanisms, 
and in the case of neuroeconomics we certainly do not, this knowledge would be irrelevant if 
 7 
it did not enable further what if -inferences concerning the original economic explananda. For 
example, Fehr and Camerer (2007) argue that multiple imaging studies showing activation of 
dorsal and ventral striata provide evidence for a hedonistic interpretation of social 
preferences, i.e., that a reward sensation has a causal role in the production of pro-social 
behaviour. Outside the highly unusual situations in which this particular causal link in the 
etiology of pro-social behaviour is broken, the knowledge of whether something happens in 
the dorsal or the ventral striatum does little to improve our economic explanations. This is 
because the mechanistic neural detail does not make a further difference with respect to the 
social and economic phenomena to be explained, given that we already know the causal role 
of social preferences. The neural information simply does not allow us to make any new 
relevant what if -inferences about economic phenomena.  
The lesson to be learned from this is that explanations find their own level. There is no 
privileged level of explanation from which every other level of description or organisation 
inherits whatever explanatory power they have. Higher-level explanations do not inherit their 
explanatory qualities from lower-level descriptions; they are explanatory because of the 
counterfactual information provided by the explanatory dependency, not as mere 
placeholders for a future ’true’ lower-level explanation (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2008). 
3. The case for a missing level 
We are now in the position to argue that the individual-level variables that are explanatorily 
relevant to economic phenomena are (at least usually) psychological, and that there is likely 
to be no viable shortcut from the neural level to economic phenomena. By the term 
psychological, we refer to causal processes mediating agents’ inputs and outputs that are 
described and individuated using informational or representational vocabulary. The 
neuroscientific findings make sense only in the light of substantial psychological theory. It is 
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not that brain processes are irrelevant to the production of behaviour, but that knowledge of 
such causal relationships does not serve the theoretical or practical purposes of economics. 
The fact that neuroscientific data can serve as evidence for psychological states and processes 
is not a basis for the direct integration between neurosciences and economics. Our argument 
is that knowledge about direct dependency relationships between neuroscientific variables 
and economic phenomena would be of little theoretical or practical use. Even if we could 
establish the existence of stable dependency relationships between neural phenomena and 
economic phenomena in a laboratory setting, these dependencies would almost certainly 1) 
have very limited applicability beyond the laboratory, 2) have only limited counterfactual 
range (“explanatory power”) and 3) be very difficult to integrate into other bodies of 
explanatory knowledge.  
1) Suppose that in some experimental setting there is a stable, invariant relation of 
dependence between increased activity in the nucleus accumbens or in the anterior insular 
cortex and the subject exhibiting risk-seeking or risk-averse behaviour (Kuhnen and Knudson 
2005). Although in a very limited way, the difference in brain activity can be said to explain 
the difference in attitude to risk in the context of the specific experimental decision problem, 
the explanation hardly goes beyond the trivial point that the behaviour is (to a large extent) 
controlled by processes in the brain. This explanation does not improve our understanding of 
economic phenomena, since it is hard to think of a scenario in which we would have access to 
data on people’s brain area activation, but not to data about the behaviour of the economic 
agents. The observable behaviour and the psychological variables that can be inferred from 
the behaviour screen off the neural details, so to speak. If we explain a market outcome on 
the basis of activations of anterior insular cortices, we are only pointing out (at most) that the 
agents were, in fact, risk averse. Of course, there is a sense in which the mass activation of 
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anterior insular cortices of investors does explain the fall in stock prices in the autumn of 
2008, but this explanation strikes us as a bit silly and pretentious, and rightly so.  
Naturally, neuroimaging data could in principle be used as evidence for values of 
psychological parameters that could be relevant outside the laboratory and could thus be used 
to improve explanations of economic phenomena. The trouble is that most laboratory 
experiments that correlate differences in brain activation across subjects to psychological or 
behavioural differences are highly indexical to the experimental set-up and therefore have 
poor external validity. For example, we cannot reliably use imaging data associated with risk-
taking behaviour of a single subject in a specific experimental decision situation to predict 
her behaviour in other decision situations, since risk-taking behaviour has turned out to be 
highly context specific (Platt and Huettel 2008).  
2) The dependency between localizable brain activity and risk-taking also has very limited 
explanatory power in the sense that we have little knowledge about how risk-taking would be 
affected if the explanatory variable (brain activity) were to take slightly different values. At 
least in the light of present knowledge, there is no systematic dependency between a brain-
area activation intensity and behaviour beyond the binary case. The range of counterfactual 
what if -questions that can be answered on the basis of the dependence is consequently very 
limited: we cannot infer to things beyond the rough expectations of the mean level of risk-
taking on the basis of rough averages of brain-area excitation. In contrast, if we model the 
choice of an agent in psychological (cognitive) terms, for example, as depending on what the 
agent values, knows and how the decision situation is framed, then we can reasonably answer 
a broader range of what if -questions concerning possible alterations in the agent’s valuations, 
knowledge and how the relevant information is presented. If we model a choice as being 
dependent on whether the agent is risk-seeking or risk-averse and if we know the information 
set the agent has at her disposal, then we can expect to answer what if -questions concerning 
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possible levels of risk-aversion and possible changes in the agent’s information set. 
Psychological variables give us more inferential power than neural variables and thus more 
understanding about the economic phenomena. 
The above points also make neuroscientific variables poor causal variables in that we have 
few possibilities to intervene on them in order to influence economic behaviour (cf. 
Woodward 2003). If we were interested in any causal handles that might be used to influence 
the market outcome, say,  to be more like the one following from widespread risk-averse 
behaviour, any identified neural variables would not be of much use in practise. Although 
there are some studies identifying neural variables that might be directly intervened on in 
practise, e.g., introducing oxytocin into breathing-air to change people’s behaviour in trust-
related games, these interventions would be ethically problematic, to say the least.2 Since 
explanations find their own level, we should discard the idea that some level of organisation 
or description is explanatorily privileged just because “the true causal work” happens there 
(i.e., the level is in some common-sense physical) or is the stuff of real hard science (e. g., 
carried out by people wearing white jackets and using sophisticated technical apparatus). 
After these ideas are discarded, it becomes hard to see what practical use the direct neuro-
economic dependencies could be. 
3) An immediate response to the previous accusation of practical uselessness would be to 
point out that science is first and foremost in the business of providing a theoretically unified 
picture of the world and that the neuroscientific level is theoretically unifying (e.g., Fehr and 
Camerer 2007). As Park and Zak (2007, p. 389) put it, “[neuroscientifically] augmented 
economic models will also likely include results from sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
and other fields. These can usefully be incorporated into economic models through the 
common pathway of the brain.” We believe the opposite: direct neuro-economic 
dependencies are hard to integrate with existing theoretical knowledge. Economic 
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phenomena are best thought of as depending on variables that are not constituted solely by 
the intrinsic properties of an individual agent, let alone of an individual brain. Instead, 
decision variables are relational, and cognition involved in economic activities is an instance 
of extended cognition.  
Since neuroeconomics is in the business of opening the black box of an individual decision 
maker, it already presupposes that it is the properties of individuals that are most relevant for 
economic theory. But for economic theory, it is often a mistake to conceptualise these 
variables as intrinsic properties of individual decision makers. It is widely acknowledged that 
straightforward localisation of a cognitive function to a brain area simply on the basis of 
imaging data is fallacious. What is not yet as widely recognised is that the localisation of 
economically relevant decision variables inside individual heads may not be much more 
sensible. This is because of two oversights in economic theory. First, as social psychological 
research strongly suggests, many of the variables that determine economic outcomes are 
relational properties of the decision situation, not intrinsic properties of the weighed 
alternatives or of the decision maker (Ross and Nisbett 1991).3 If we restrict our attention to 
what happens inside a brain, we might lose most of the significant variables affecting 
economic phenomena. Second, as sociological research has recently emphasised, a major part 
of the functioning of the markets is in the material means of conducting trade. Economic 
decision making employs external tools of cognition extensively. (e.g., MacKenzie 2009.) 
These two considerations make any dependencies between neural and economic variables 
highly context dependent, more of a fluke of the particular circumstances than something that 
could be systematically integrated into a larger body of theory. 
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4. Integrating knowledge the mechanistic way 
In this section we argue that the proper way to conceptualise the integration of neuroscience 
and economics is as parts of a mechanistic research programme. We contrast the model of a 
mechanistic research programme on the one hand, to forms of explanatory unification 
appealed to by some advocates of neuroeconomics, and, on the other hand, to appeals for 
hermetic insulation of economics as a separate science of choice aggregation made by some 
prominent deniers of neuroeconomics (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008).  
A typical mechanistic programme of opening black boxes proceeds according to the 
heuristics of functional decomposition and localisation (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; 
Craver 2007). First, the different phenomena that the system of interest exhibits are 
differentiated. Then the phenomenon of interest is functionally decomposed in the sense of 
being analysed into a set of possible component operations that would be sufficient to 
produce the phenomenon. One can think of this step as thinking of a preliminary set of simple 
functions that, taken together, would constitute a more complex input-output relation (the 
system-level phenomenon). The system is also structurally decomposed or analysed into a set 
of component parts. The final step is to try to localise the component operations by mapping 
the operations unto appropriate structural component parts. The primary meaning of 
localisation here is the pairing of operations and parts, not (necessarily) that of locating 
something in physical space. The idea is thus to first think of what kinds of more basic 
properties or behaviours could, taken together, result in the explanandum behaviour and then 
try to determine whether the system is in fact made of such entities that can do the jobs 
required.  
If and when the above cannot be done, then the fault may lie either in the manner of the 
functional decomposition or of the structural decomposition (or both), and these may then 
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have to be rethought. If a discovery about the lower-level realising mechanism means that the 
system cannot perform a certain function in a way that was assumed in the initial functional 
decomposition, then the functional decomposition may have to be altered. Conversely, if our 
functional decomposition seems otherwise sound (fits well in the pattern of causal 
explanations in higher-level terms), but is hard to reconcile with what we believe about the 
realising mechanism, then we may have to rethink the way we have conceptualised the 
components of the realising mechanism. In the end, even the identification of the target 
phenomenon or system may have to be revised. Mechanistic research does not eliminate 
higher levels of organisation nor does it treat higher or lower levels as sacrosanct. The goal is 
to find mutually consistent dependencies between things at different levels of organisation. 
This mechanistic research programme provides the proper context for evaluating the 
localisation hypotheses presented by neuroeconomics. Functional localisation plays an 
important role in mechanistic research, but every neuroscientist acknowledges that a mere 
functional localisation does not by itself explain anything (Cacioppo et al. 2003; Henson 
2005; Coltheart 2006). Observing that something happens in a specific area of the brain when 
a subject exhibits hyperbolic discounting or altruistic punishing behaviour does not by itself 
explain the behaviour. As was argued in the previous section, the variables that are 
explanatorily relevant for economic phenomena are psychological, and neuroscientific 
evidence is explanatorily relevant for psychological variables if and only if it constrains or 
informs the functional decomposition of the psychological theory. Neuroscientific discoveries 
can and should be relevant for economics, but only via the psychological level. 
The trouble is that so far most neuroeconomic results do not have such implications or they 
simply demonstrate behavioural and cognitive deviations from the standard economic 
modelling assumptions that have been well known for decades (on the basis of behavioural 
studies). Is it really that surprising that people exhibit aversion to social betrayal beyond 
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monetary loss, that decisions dependent on and affecting the actions of other people involve 
affective as well as cognitive factors, that most brain processes are unconscious or that most 
of us buy more at the grocery store when we are hungry? Finding coherence between 
activations of specific brain areas and such psychological and behavioural phenomena does 
provide some additional evidence for the existence of such phenomena, but this evidential 
import is still distinct from explanatory import. However, there is a telling asymmetry even in 
this evidential use: neuroscientific findings are so far only used for confirmatory purposes. It 
is generally regarded as an achievement that imaging studies can distinguish between two 
cognitive processes at all. Finding such contrasts is regarded as supporting hypotheses that 
postulate such differences. However, the failure to find such contrasts is not regarded as 
disconfirming such hypotheses. Thus, even the triangulating function of neuroscientific 
findings is not yet taken to be all that reliable.  
Integration of knowledge according to the mechanistic picture is tightly constrained by the 
actual causal and constitutive dependencies in the system investigated: a lower-level finding 
is explanatorily relevant if the new knowledge allows us to make new accurate what if -
inferences about the behaviour of the system. The validity of these inferences depends on the 
causal facts in question: knowledge of a neuroscientific mechanism is explanatorily relevant 
to cognition or behaviour if we can use it to answer new contrastive what if -questions 
concerning cognition or behaviour. There is no a priori guarantee that the form of these new 
inferences resembles patterns of inference applicable to the original system level. Even if we 
can model choice behaviour as maximization of some function, it does not mean that 
whatever mechanism is (partially) causally responsible for the choices should or could be 
modelled as maximizing something – just as the fact that we can model the functional role of 
the cerebellum using adaptive filter models does not mean that we can do the same to the 
individual neurons of the cerebellum. In contrast, much of the unificatory appeal of 
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economics in general and neuroeconomics in particular is in the perceived universal 
applicability of the abstract principles of constrained optimization. If familiar patterns of 
reasoning are applicable to a set of new phenomena, then formulating explanations for these 
novel phenomena is easier (cognitively less demanding), but this alone is not constitutive of 
explanatory relevance (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2009). 
Difficulties in conceptualising the proper integration of knowledge may also contribute to 
misplaced attributions of explanatory relevance in other ways. Since there is no explicit and 
openly discussed set of standards for explanatory relevance across disciplinary boundaries, it 
is easy for researchers to fall victim to various illusions of depth of understanding (Skolnick 
Weisberg et al. 2008; Ylikoski 2009) when interpreting results outside their specialty. This is 
true for economists trying to evaluate the relevance of neuroscience as well as for the larger 
public (and the rest of academia) trying to evaluate the relevance of neuroeconomics. An 
illusion of depth of understanding simply means that a person overestimates the detail, 
coherence and extent of her understanding. Based on a subjective sense of understanding, the 
scientist overestimates the number of correct what if -inferences about the phenomenon. 
These problems are especially prominent in cross-disciplinary explanatory endeavours, as 
scientists’ sense of understanding is usually poorly calibrated for knowledge outside their 
own specialities. (Ylikoski 2009.)  
The danger of illusory understanding is especially prominent in the case of neuroeconomics, 
since there is some experimental evidence that neuroscientific detail is, for some reason, 
especially conducive to misplaced attribution of explanatory relevance. Weisberg et al. 
(2008) have shown that inclusion of irrelevant neuroscientific details in a research report 
makes the report more convincing to non-experts. Even the simple inclusion of images of the 
brain in a paper or on the title page has similar effects on the evaluation of explanatory 
relevance (McCabe and Castel 2008). The trouble with neuroeconomics is precisely that 
 16 
many in the intended audience are not experts with respect to neuroscience and hence are 
susceptible to this effect. This experimental evidence strongly indicates that intuitions based 
on the sense of understanding should be replaced by explicit criteria of explanatory relevance 
in the assessment of the relevance of neuroscientific findings to economics. 
5. Conclusions  
The discovery of neural mechanisms underlying economic decision making does not 
automatically improve economic explanations. Explaining an explanatory presupposition or 
providing a lower-level explanation does not constitute explanatory improvement unless the 
neuroscientific information provides grounds for making new what if -inferences concerning 
the original economic explananda. Neuroeconomics should be seen as a part of a mechanistic 
research programme, a mosaic of interconnected and mutually consistent set of explanations 
across different levels of organisation, not as a driver of grand unification of the social 
sciences. This implies that neuroeconomic data are explanatorily relevant only when they 
inform a causal and explanatory account of the psychology of human decision-making. So far 
they have not done so.  
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1 Limitations of space mean that we cannot here provide additional arguments for our adopted theory of 
explanation. For these, see the cited references. 
2 Park and Zak (2007, p. 390) state that ”the role of oxytocin, and more generally empathy, in building trust has 
clear implications for institutional design to increase trade”. If the reference to oxytocin is removed, the 
statement does not go beyond Adam Smith. If the reference to empathy is removed, the statement suggests a 
novel and frightening approach to institutional design. 
3 It is again important to note that this context-dependency does not make neuroscience irrelevant for 
understanding human behaviour in general; quite the contrary (see Ariely and Norton 2008). 
